Daniel Wesley v. Secretary Pennsylvania Departm by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-16-2014 
Daniel Wesley v. Secretary Pennsylvania Departm 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"Daniel Wesley v. Secretary Pennsylvania Departm" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 570. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/570 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 
CLD-272        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4360 
___________ 
 
DANIEL WESLEY, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;  
VINCENT MOONEY; ANTHONY LUSCAVAGE; MR. BAKER; KATHRYN K. 
MCCARTY; ALAN J. POPICK, sued in their Individual and Official capacities 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1:13-cv-02226) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones, III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 5, 2014 
 
Before:  FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 16, 2014) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Daniel Wesley, a state prisoner, filed a pro se complaint against prison officials 
and medical staff, asserting that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious 
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Specifically, he alleged that they 
refused him surgery to reverse a colostomy on the basis of non-medical cost 
considerations.  He further alleged that the refusal caused him to suffer pain and a 
parastomal hernia.  Attached to his complaint, he included grievances and prison 
officials’ responses thereto, which discussed his course of medical treatment and a 
physician’s opinion that the risk of colostomy reversal outweighed the benefits.   
 Relatively shortly after he filed his complaint, Wesley filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction.  Seeking an order for colostomy reversal surgery, Wesley stated 
that he was likely to succeed on the merits of his complaint based on his allegations.  He 
further alleged that he would suffer irreparable harm, namely serious physical injury, if 
the colostomy were not reversed.  Four defendants (those who had received the complaint 
at that point) opposed the motion.1  Wesley separately moved for appointment of counsel.   
 The District Court denied both of Wesley’s motions.  For the purposes of the 
motion for a preliminary injunction, the District Court reasoned that, at the early stage of 
the case and given the pending motion for dismiss, Wesley had not shown a reasonable 
probability of success on the merits.  The District Court also concluded that Wesley was 
                                              
1 As a group, they also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.   
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not in danger of irreparable harm based on the record of medical treatment and absence 
of medical evidence in support of Wesley’s allegations.  The District Court also denied 
the motion for appointment of counsel without prejudice to renewed motion later in the 
proceedings.  Wesley appeals.2   
 First, we consider the scope of our jurisdiction.  Appellate jurisdiction attaches 
over an appeal from a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, from a collateral order under 
the doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949), 
from an appropriate order relating to the grant or denial of injunctive relief under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a), and questions certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 54(b).  See In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 211 (3d Cir. 2006).  We may 
review the District Court’s order denying the motion for a preliminary injunction as an 
interlocutory order “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, 
or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions.”  28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  However, the 
order denying the motion for appointment of counsel is not a final order or otherwise 
appealable at this time.  See Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(holding that an order denying a motion for appointment of counsel may be reviewed 
only on appeal from the final judgment).  We must dismiss that aspect of this appeal for 
lack of appellate jurisdiction.   
                                              
2 He has submitted two documents in support of his appeal, which we have reviewed.   
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 We “review the denial of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion, an 
error of law, or a clear mistake in the consideration of proof.”  Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx 
Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted).  To obtain the 
“extraordinary remedy” of a preliminary injunction, the moving party must establish: “(1) 
a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that [he] will suffer irreparable harm if the 
injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater 
harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.”  Id.  
Additionally, “a showing of irreparable harm is insufficient if the harm will occur only in 
the indefinite future.  Rather, the moving party must make a clear showing of immediate 
irreparable harm.”  Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(internal quotations omitted).  Furthermore, a request for injunctive relief in the prison 
context must be viewed with great caution because of the intractable problems of prison 
administration.  See Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 Upon review, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s denial of the motion 
for a preliminary injunction because no substantial question is presented on appeal.  See 
3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  The District Court did not err in concluding that 
a preliminary injunction was not warranted on the record before it.  In his motion for a 
preliminary injunction, Wesley sought the same ultimate injunctive relief that he sought 
in his complaint.  He relied on the complaint, which, along with its allegations of a 
medical decision based on cost-containment reasons, included information that suggested 
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a disagreement about a course of medical treatment provided in a prison.  Accordingly, 
the likelihood of Wesley’s success on the merits was unclear.  Additionally, Wesley did 
not make a clear showing of immediate irreparable harm, especially given the 
information in the record about his course of treatment.  In short, the District Court did 
not err in concluding that Wesley did not meet the standard for the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction.     
 For these reasons, to the extent that we have jurisdiction over this appeal, we will 
affirm the District Court’s judgment.  The appeal is otherwise dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
 
